| 2025 | AAAI | On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms. | Shiri Ron, Daniel Schoepflin |
| 2025 | SODA | Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice. | Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan |
| 2025 | STOC | Multi-parameter Mechanisms for Consumer Surplus Maximization. | Tomer Ezra, Daniel Schoepflin, Ariel Shaulker |
| 2025 | SAGT | A Truthful and Accurate Forecasting Competition Mechanism on Bayesian Network Structured Events. | Chun Lau, David Pennock, Daniel Schoepflin |
| 2022 | SODA | Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. | Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan |
| 2021 | AAAI | Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods. | Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin |
| 2021 | IJCAI | PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents. | Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin |
| 2021 | SAGT | Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. | Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin |