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S. Matthew Weinberg

Publication record assembled from the DBLP archive of ranked conferences.

Papers indexed

43

Venues

15

Active years

2010–2026

Best venue rank

A*

Where they publish

Papers

43 indexed papers, newest first.

YearVenueTitleAuthors
2026SODAThe Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Additional Succinct Bidders.Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
2025AFTSelfish Mining Under General Stochastic Rewards.Maryam Bahrani, Michael Neuder, S. Matthew Weinberg
2025CCSBreaking Omert: On Threshold Cryptography, Smart Collusion, and Whistleblowing.Mahimna Kelkar, Aadityan Ganesh, Aditi Partap, Joseph Bonneau, S. Matthew Weinberg
2025ICALPq-Partitioning Valuations: Exploring the Space Between Subadditive and Fractionally Subadditive Valuations.Kiril Bangachev, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024AFTOptimal RANDAO Manipulation in Ethereum.Kaya Alpturer, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024AFTProfitable Manipulations of Cryptographic Self-Selection Are Statistically Detectable.Linda Cai, Jingyi Liu, S. Matthew Weinberg, Chenghan Zhou
2024FOCSCommunication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier.Shiri Ron, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Qianfan Zhang
2024ICALPOn the Cut-Query Complexity of Approximating Max-Cut.Orestis Plevrakis, Seyoon Ragavan, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024STOCSettling the Communication Complexity of VCG-Based Mechanisms for All Approximation Guarantees.Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg
2024SAGTTo Regulate or Not to Regulate: Using Revenue Maximization Tools to Maximize Consumer Utility.Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner, S. Matthew Weinberg
2022IPCOOptimal Item Pricing in Online Combinatorial Auctions.Jos Correa, Andrs Cristi, Andrs Fielbaum, Tristan Pollner, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021AAAIA Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design.Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, Joan Bruna, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021ICLRAuction Learning as a Two-Player Game.Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, S. Matthew Weinberg
2021STOCExponential communication separations between notions of selfishness.Aviad Rubinstein, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg, Junyao Zhao
2020AAAISubsidy Allocations in the Presence of Income Shocks.Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020ICALPAsynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees.Maryam Bahrani, Nicole Immorlica, Divyarthi Mohan, S. Matthew Weinberg
2020ICMLDecentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions.Michael Chang, Sidhant Kaushik, S. Matthew Weinberg, Tom Griffiths, Sergey Levine
2020STOCSeparating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions.Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019COLTMulti-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms.Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019ECFormal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols.Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019ECSmoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values.Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019FOCSSettling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers.Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019FOCSApproximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries.Pravesh Kothari, Sahil Singla, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2019WWWSelling a Single Item with Negative Externalities.Matheus Xavier Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg, Danny Yuxing Huang, Nick Feamster, Tithi Chattopadhyay
2019STOCOptimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items.Hedyeh Beyhaghi, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018FOCSThe Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization.Yannai A. Gonczarowski, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018SODAOn Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions.Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg
2018SODAThe menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design.Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg
2017INFOCOMDiscovering valuations and enforcing truthfulness in a deadline-aware scheduler.Zhe Huang, S. Matthew Weinberg, Liang Zheng, Carlee Joe-Wong, Mung Chiang
2016CCSOn the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward.Miles Carlsten, Harry A. Kalodner, S. Matthew Weinberg, Arvind Narayanan
2016SODAInterpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions.Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016STOCParallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons.Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg
2016STOCA duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design.Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg
2015SODABayesian TruthfulConstantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014FOCSA Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer.Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
2014SODAProphet Inequalities with Limited Information.Pablo Daniel Azar, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2013FOCSUnderstanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design.Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2013SODAOptimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions.Pablo Daniel Azar, Constantinos Daskalakis, Silvio Micali, S. Matthew Weinberg
2013SODAReducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations.Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2012FOCSOptimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization.Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2012STOCAn algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms.Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
2012STOCMatroid prophet inequalities.Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
2010SODAPricing Randomized Allocations.Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg