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Vincent Conitzer

Publication record assembled from the DBLP archive of ranked conferences.

Papers indexed

132

Venues

18

Active years

2002–2026

Best venue rank

A*

Where they publish

Papers

132 indexed papers, newest first.

YearVenueTitleAuthors
2026AAAIOn the Edge of Core (Non-)Emptiness: An Automated Reasoning Approach to Approval-Based Multi-Winner Voting.Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Marijn Heule, Lirong Xia
2026AAAIMoral Change or Noise? On Problems of Aligning AI with Temporally Unstable Human Feedback.Vijay Keswani, Cyrus Cousins, Breanna K. Nguyen, Vincent Conitzer, Hoda Heidari, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
2025AAAIThe Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games.Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Ioannis Anagnostides, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer
2025AAAICharacterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria.Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
2025AAAIComputing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them.Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer
2025CHICan AI Model the Complexities of Human Moral Decision-making? A Qualitative Study of Kidney Allocation Decisions.Vijay Keswani, Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Breanna K. Nguyen, Hoda Heidari, Jana Schaich Borg
2025ICMLObservation Interference in Partially Observable Assistance Games.Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer, Stuart Russell
2025ICMLExpected Variational Inequalities.Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde, Ratip Emin Berker, Gabriele Farina, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2024AAAIThe Complexity of Computing Robust Mediated Equilibria in Ordinal Games.Vincent Conitzer
2024AAAINon-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups.Yixuan Even Xu, Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer
2024AIESOn The Stability of Moral Preferences: A Problem with Computational Elicitation Methods.Kyle Boerstler, Vijay Keswani, Lok Chan, Jana Schaich Borg, Vincent Conitzer, Hoda Heidari, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
2024AIESOn the Pros and Cons of Active Learning for Moral Preference Elicitation.Vijay Keswani, Vincent Conitzer, Hoda Heidari, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
2024ICMLPosition: Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback.Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, Jobst Heitzig, Wesley H. Holliday, Bob M. Jacobs, Nathan Lambert, Milan Moss, Eric Pacuit, Stuart Russell, Hailey Schoelkopf, Emanuel Tewolde, William S. Zwicker
2024IJCAIComputing Optimal Equilibria in Repeated Games with Restarts.Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer
2024IJCAIGame Transformations That Preserve Nash Equilibria or Best-Response Sets.Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer
2024IJCAIImperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity.Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Manolis Zampetakis, Tuomas Sandholm, Paul Goldberg, Vincent Conitzer
2023AAAIFoundations of Cooperative AI.Vincent Conitzer, Caspar Oesterheld
2023IJCAIGame Theory with Simulation of Other Players.Vojtech Kovark, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
2023IJCAIThe Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games.Emanuel Tewolde, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer, Paul W. Goldberg
2023WWWA Dataset on Malicious Paper Bidding in Peer Review.Steven Jecmen, Minji Yoon, Vincent Conitzer, Nihar B. Shah, Fei Fang
2022AAAILearning Influence Adoption in Heterogeneous Networks.Vincent Conitzer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Hanrui Zhang
2022AAAIPlanning with Participation Constraints.Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
2022HCOMPNear-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing and Conference Experiment Design.Steven Jecmen, Hanrui Zhang, Ryan Liu, Fei Fang, Vincent Conitzer, Nihar B. Shah
2022ICMLFor Learning in Symmetric Teams, Local Optima are Global Nash Equilibria.Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Andrew Critch, Vincent Conitzer, Stuart Russell
2021AAAIClassification with Strategically Withheld Data.Anilesh K. Krishnaswamy, Haoming Li, David Rein, Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer
2021AAAIIndecision Modeling.Duncan C. McElfresh, Lok Chan, Kenzie Doyle, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Vincent Conitzer, Jana Schaich Borg, John P. Dickerson
2021AAAIAutomated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification.Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
2021AAAIClassification with Few Tests through Self-Selection.Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
2021AAAIIncentive-Aware PAC Learning.Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer
2021AIESEthical Implementation of Artificial Intelligence to Select Embryos in In Vitro Fertilization.Michael Anis Mihdi Afnan, Cynthia Rudin, Vincent Conitzer, Julian Savulescu, Abhishek Mishra, Yanhe Liu, Masoud Afnan
2021KDDAutomated Mechanism Design for Strategic Classification: Abstract for KDD'21 Keynote Talk.Vincent Conitzer
2020AIESArtificial Artificial Intelligence: Measuring Influence of AI 'Assessments' on Moral Decision-Making.Lok Chan, Kenzie Doyle, Duncan C. McElfresh, Vincent Conitzer, John P. Dickerson, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
2020ICMLLearning Opinions in Social Networks.Vincent Conitzer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Hanrui Zhang
2020ICMLLearning the Valuations of a k-demand Agent.Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer
2020IJCAIExtracting Money from Causal Decision Theorists.Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
2019AAAIDesigning Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities for Artificial Intelligence.Vincent Conitzer
2019AAAIGroup Fairness for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods.Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
2019AAAIA PAC Framework for Aggregating Agents' Judgments.Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer
2019AAAIA Better Algorithm for Societal Tradeoffs.Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
2019ECPacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets.Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Okke Schrijvers, Eric Sodomka, Nicols E. Stier Moses, Chris Wilkens
2019ICMLWhen Samples Are Strategically Selected.Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
2018AAAIDisarmament Games With Resource.Yuan Deng, Vincent Conitzer
2018AAAIAdapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align With Human Values.Rachel Freedman, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, John P. Dickerson, Vincent Conitzer
2018AIESAdapting a Kidney Exchange Algorithm to Align with Human Values.Rachel Freedman, Jana Schaich Borg, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, John P. Dickerson, Vincent Conitzer
2018AIESWhen Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?Max F. Kramer, Jana Schaich Borg, Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
2018IJCAIComplexity of Scheduling Charging in the Smart Grid.Mathijs de Weerdt, Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Koos van der Linden
2018ISAIMMoral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence.Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jana Schaich Borg, Yuan Deng, Max Kramer
2018SIGMETRICSDynamic Proportional Sharing: A Game-Theoretic Approach.Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi, Vincent Conitzer, Benjamin C. Lee
2017AAAIAutomated Design of Robust Mechanisms.Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Peter Stone
2017AAAIMoral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence.Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jana Schaich Borg, Yuan Deng, Max Kramer
2017AAAIMoral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence.Vincent Conitzer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jana Schaich Borg, Yuan Deng, Max Kramer
2017AAAIDisarmament Games.Yuan Deng, Vincent Conitzer
2017IJCAIFair and Efficient Social Choice in Dynamic Settings.Rupert Freeman, Seyed Majid Zahedi, Vincent Conitzer
2016AAAIMaximizing Revenue with Limited Correlation: The Cost of Ex-Post Incentive Compatibility.Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Giuseppe Lopomo
2016AAAIComputing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners).Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Vincent Conitzer
2016AAAIRules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs.Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, Yuqian Li
2016IJCAIATUCAPTS: Automated Tests that a User Cannot Pass Twice Simultaneously.Garrett Andersen, Vincent Conitzer
2016IJCAICatcher-Evader Games.Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer, Dmytro Korzhyk
2016IJCAIRole Assignment for Game-Theoretic Cooperation.Catherine Moon, Vincent Conitzer
2016ISAIMFalse-Name-Proof Recommendations in Social Networks.Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah
2016ISAIMComputing Possible and Necessary Equilibrium Actions (and Bipartisan Set Winners).Markus Brill, Rupert Freeman, Vincent Conitzer
2016ISAIMRules for Choosing Societal Tradeoffs.Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, Yuqian Li
2015AAAIAssessing the Robustness of Cremer-McLean with Automated Mechanism Design.Michael Albert, Vincent Conitzer, Giuseppe Lopomo
2015AAAIJustified Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting.Haris Aziz, Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer, Edith Elkind, Rupert Freeman, Toby Walsh
2015AAAIStrategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy.Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer
2015AAAICooperative Game Solution Concepts that Maximize Stability under Noise.Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer
2015IJCAIMaximal Cooperation in Repeated Games on Social Networks.Catherine Moon, Vincent Conitzer
2014AAAIMechanism Design for Scheduling with Uncertain Execution Time.Vincent Conitzer, Angelina Vidali
2014AAAIOn the Axiomatic Characterization of Runoff Voting Rules.Rupert Freeman, Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer
2014AAAIBeat the Cheater: Computing Game-Theoretic Strategies for When to Kick a Gambler out of a Casino.Troels Bjerre Srensen, Melissa Dalis, Joshua Letchford, Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer
2014AAAISolving Zero-Sum Security Games in Discretized Spatio-Temporal Domains.Haifeng Xu, Fei Fang, Albert Xin Jiang, Vincent Conitzer, Shaddin Dughmi, Milind Tambe
2014ISAIMThe Maximum Likelihood Approach to Voting on Social Networks.Vincent Conitzer
2013AAAIFast Equilibrium Computation for Infinitely Repeated Games.Garrett Andersen, Vincent Conitzer
2013AAAISolving Security Games on Graphs via Marginal Probabilities.Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer
2013IJCAIGame-Theoretic Question Selection for Tests.Yuqian Li, Vincent Conitzer
2012AAAIComputing Game-Theoretic Solutions and Applications to Security.Vincent Conitzer
2012AAAIComputing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic Games.Joshua Letchford, Liam MacDermed, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr, Charles L. Isbell Jr.
2012AAAIEvaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections.Bo Waggoner, Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
2012ISAIMApproximating Common Voting Rules by Sequential Voting in Multi-Issue Domains.Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
2012KRParadoxes of Multiple Elections: An Approximation Approach.Vincent Conitzer, Lirong Xia
2011AAAICommitment to Correlated Strategies.Vincent Conitzer, Dmytro Korzhyk
2011AAAIDominating Manipulations in Voting with Partial Information.Vincent Conitzer, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia
2011IJCAIHypercubewise Preference Aggregation in Multi-Issue Domains.Vincent Conitzer, Jrme Lang, Lirong Xia
2011IJCAISecurity Games with Multiple Attacker Resources.Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr
2011IJCAIA Maximum Likelihood Approach towards Aggregating Partial Orders.Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
2010AAAIComputationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies.Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
2010AAAIComplexity of Computing Optimal Stackelberg Strategies in Security Resource Allocation Games.Dmytro Korzhyk, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr
2010AAAICompilation Complexity of Common Voting Rules.Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
2010AAAIStackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes.Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
2010SODAIncentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions.Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, Lirong Xia
2009CPCoalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Characteristic Function Representations.Naoki Ohta, Vincent Conitzer, Ryo Ichimura, Yuko Sakurai, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo
2009IJCAIHow Hard Is It to Control Sequential Elections via the Agenda?Vincent Conitzer, Jrme Lang, Lirong Xia
2009IJCAIPreference Functions that Score Rankings and Maximum Likelihood Estimation.Vincent Conitzer, Matthew Rognlie, Lirong Xia
2009IJCAIMulti-Step Multi-Sensor Hider-Seeker Games.Erik Halvorson, Vincent Conitzer, Ronald Parr
2009IJCAIFinite Local Consistency Characterizes Generalized Scoring Rules.Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
2009IJCAIComplexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Some Common Voting Rules.Lirong Xia, Michael Zuckerman, Ariel D. Procaccia, Vincent Conitzer, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
2009UAIPrediction Markets, Mechanism Design, and Cooperative Game Theory.Vincent Conitzer
2009SAGTLearning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To.Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala
2008AAAIOptimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting.Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer
2008AAAIDetermining Possible and Necessary Winners under Common Voting Rules Given Partial Orders.Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
2008AAAIVoting on Multiattribute Domains with Cyclic Preferential Dependencies.Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jrme Lang
2008ISAIMComparing Multiagent Systems Research in Combinatorial Auctions and Voting.Vincent Conitzer
2007IJCAIIncremental Mechanism Design.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2007IJCAIAutomated Design of Multistage Mechanisms.Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier
2007TARKLimited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness.Vincent Conitzer
2006AAAIComputing Slater Rankings Using Similarities among Candidates.Vincent Conitzer
2006AAAIImproved Bounds for Computing Kemeny Rankings.Vincent Conitzer, Andrew J. Davenport, Jayant Kalagnanam
2006AAAINonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2006AAAIA Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2006ICMLLearning algorithms for online principal-agent problems (and selling goods online).Vincent Conitzer, Nikesh Garera
2005AAAIComputational Aspects of Mechanism Design.Vincent Conitzer
2005AAAIExpressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2005AAAIA Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2005AAAICombinatorial Auctions withVincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi
2005AAAIMixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria.Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer
2005AAAICoalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
2005IJCAICoalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments.Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki
2005UAICommon Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2004AAAICombinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs.Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm
2004AAAIComputing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2004COLTTowards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract).Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2004ICMLCommunication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2003ICMLAWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2003ICMLBL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2003IJCAIComplexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2003IJCAIComplexity Results about Nash Equilibria.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2003IJCAIUniversal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2003IJCAIDefinition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2003TARKHow many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?Vincent Conitzer, Jrme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm
2002AAAIComplexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2002AAAIVote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
2002UAIComplexity of Mechanism Design.Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm