| 2026 | SODA | Contextual Search in Principal-Agent Games: The Curse of Degeneracy. | Yiding Feng, Mengfan Ma, Bo Peng, Zongqi Wan |
| 2026 | SODA | Persuasive Calibration. | Yiding Feng, Wei Tang |
| 2025 | FOCS | Beyond Regularity: Simple versus Optimal Mechanisms, Revisited. | Yiding Feng, Yaonan Jin |
| 2024 | SODA | Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Persuasion under Quantal Response. | Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho, Wei Tang |
| 2024 | STOC | Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World. | Yiding Feng, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins |
| 2023 | SODA | Competitive Information Design for Pandora's Box. | Bolin Ding, Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho, Wei Tang, Haifeng Xu |
| 2023 | SODA | Simple Mechanisms for Non-linear Agents. | Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li |
| 2021 | SODA | Two-stage Stochastic Matching with Application to Ride Hailing. | Yiding Feng, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi |
| 2021 | STOC | Revelation gap for pricing from samples. | Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li |
| 2020 | ICML | Global Concavity and Optimization in a Class of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models. | Yiding Feng, Ekaterina Khmelnitskaya, Denis Nekipelov |
| 2019 | EC | Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility. | Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li |
| 2018 | FOCS | An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents). | Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline |