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International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

SAGT

B

CORE rank

CORE rank (raw)

B

Fields of research

Theory of Computation

Papers indexed

484

2008–2025

Papers per year

200832 peak2025

SAGT papers

484 records sourced from DBLP. Search titles, filter by year, sort by recency.

YearTitleAuthors
2020Modified Schelling Games.Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Alexandros A. Voudouris
2020The Impact of Spillback on the Price of Anarchy for Flows over Time.Jonas Israel, Leon Sering
2020A Unifying Approximate Potential for Weighted Congestion Games.Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Diogo Poas
2020A New Lower Bound for Deterministic Truthful Scheduling.Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexander Hammerl, Diogo Poas
2020Equilibrium Inefficiency in Resource Buying Games with Load-Dependent Costs.Eirini Georgoulaki, Kostas Kollias, Tami Tamir
2020Mechanism Design for Perturbation Stable Combinatorial Auctions.Giannis Fikioris, Dimitris Fotakis
2020Recognizing Single-Peaked Preferences on an Arbitrary Graph: Complexity and Algorithms.Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard, Magdalna Tydrichov
2020Targeted Intervention in Random Graphs.William Brown, Utkarsh Patange
2020Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage.Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Rolf Niedermeier
2020Line-Up Elections: Parallel Voting with Shared Candidate Pool.Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Rolf Niedermeier
2020Congestion Games with Priority-Based Scheduling.Vittorio Bil, Cosimo Vinci
2020Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don't Add Up.Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi, Yair Zick
2020Asymptotically Optimal Communication in Simple Mechanisms.Ioannis Anagnostides, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos
2020Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding.Mete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta
2019Optimal Truth-Tracking Rules for the Aggregation of Incomplete Judgments.Zoi Terzopoulou, Ulle Endriss
2019Principal-Agent Problems with Present-Biased Agents.Sigal Oren, Dolav Soker
2019Risk-Free Bidding in Complement-Free Combinatorial Auctions.Vishnu V. Narayan, Gautam Rayaprolu, Adrian Vetta
2019The Declining Price Anomaly Is Not Universal in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions (But Almost Is).Vishnu V. Narayan, Enguerrand Prebet, Adrian Vetta
2019Mechanism Design for Locating a Facility Under Partial Information.Vijay Menon, Kate Larson
2019Strategyproof Facility Location for Three Agents on a Circle.Reshef Meir
2019Risk Robust Mechanism Design for a Prospect Theoretic Buyer.Siqi Liu, J. Benjamin Miller, Alexandros Psomas
2019Maximum Stable Matching with One-Sided Ties of Bounded Length.Chi-Kit Lam, C. Gregory Plaxton
2019On the Existence of Three-Dimensional Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences.Chi-Kit Lam, C. Gregory Plaxton
2019Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location.Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre, Xiaomeng Zhang
2019The Online Best Reply Algorithm for Resource Allocation Problems.Max Klimm, Daniel Schmand, Andreas Tnnis
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