| 2026 | WWW | Understanding Strategic Platform Entry and Seller Exploration: A Stackelberg Model. | Garrett Seo, Xintong Wang, David C. Parkes |
| 2024 | AAAI | Strategic Recommendation: Revenue Optimal Matching for Online Platforms (Student Abstract). | Luca D'Amico-Wong, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes |
| 2024 | ICLR | Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers. | Denizalp Goktas, David C. Parkes, Ian Gemp, Luke Marris, Georgios Piliouras, Romuald Elie, Guy Lever, Andrea Tacchetti |
| 2024 | ICLR | Decongestion by Representation: Learning to Improve Economic Welfare in Marketplaces. | Omer Nahum, Gali Noti, David C. Parkes, Nir Rosenfeld |
| 2024 | ICML | Multi-Sender Persuasion: A Computational Perspective. | Safwan Hossain, Tonghan Wang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu |
| 2024 | ICML | Position: Social Environment Design Should be Further Developed for AI-based Policy-Making. | Edwin Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Tonghan Wang, Safwan Hossain, Henry Gasztowtt, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes, Milind Tambe, Yiling Chen |
| 2023 | AAAI | Predictive Multiplicity in Probabilistic Classification. | Jamelle Watson-Daniels, David C. Parkes, Berk Ustun |
| 2023 | AFT | Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap V3. | Zhou Fan, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cosso, Daniel J. Moroz, Michael Neuder, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes |
| 2023 | AISTATS | Reinforcement Learning with Stepwise Fairness Constraints. | Zhun Deng, He Sun, Steven Wu, Linjun Zhang, David C. Parkes |
| 2023 | ICML | Oracles & Followers: Stackelberg Equilibria in Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. | Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes |
| 2023 | WWW | Platform Behavior under Market Shocks: A Simulation Framework and Reinforcement-Learning Based Study. | Xintong Wang, Gary Qiurui Ma, Alon Eden, Clara Li, Alexander Trott, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes |
| 2023 | SIGCSE | Empowering First-Year Computer Science Ph.D. Students to Create a Culture that Values Community and Mental Health. | Yaniv Yacoby, John Girash, David C. Parkes |
| 2023 | STOC | Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. | Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira, David C. Parkes |
| 2022 | AAAI | Reinforcement Learning Explainability via Model Transforms (Student Abstract). | Mira Finkelstein, Lucy Liu, Yoav Kolumbus, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenshein, Sarah Keren |
| 2022 | ICLR | CrowdPlay: Crowdsourcing Human Demonstrations for Offline Learning. | Matthias Gerstgrasser, Rakshit S. Trivedi, David C. Parkes |
| 2021 | AAAI | Reinforcement Learning of Sequential Price Mechanisms. | Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes, Duncan Rheingans-Yoo |
| 2021 | AFT | Dynamic posted-price mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market. | Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, Mitchell Stern |
| 2021 | ICML | Learning Representations by Humans, for Humans. | Sophie Hilgard, Nir Rosenfeld, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Jack Cao, David C. Parkes |
| 2020 | AAAI | Information Shaping for Enhanced Goal Recognition of Partially-Informed Agents. | Sarah Keren, Haifeng Xu, Kofi Kwapong, David C. Parkes, Barbara J. Grosz |
| 2020 | AAAI | The Effectiveness of Peer Prediction in Long-Term Forecasting. | Debmalya Mandal, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes |
| 2020 | AFT | Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-of-Stake. | Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes |
| 2020 | CogSci | Too many cooks: Coordinating multi-agent collaboration through inverse planning. | Sarah A. Wu, Rose E. Wang, James A. Evans, Josh Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes, Max Kleiman-Weiner |
| 2020 | ICML | The Intrinsic Robustness of Stochastic Bandits to Strategic Manipulation. | Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu |
| 2020 | KR | Reasoning About Plan Robustness Versus Plan Cost for Partially Informed Agents. | Sarah Keren, Sara Bernardini, Kofi Kwapong, David C. Parkes |
| 2020 | WWW | A Kernel of Truth: Determining Rumor Veracity on Twitter by Diffusion Pattern Alone. | Nir Rosenfeld, Aron Szanto, David C. Parkes |
| 2019 | AAAI | Bayesian Fairness. | Christos Dimitrakakis, Yang Liu, David C. Parkes, Goran Radanovic |
| 2019 | AIES | How Do Fairness Definitions Fare?: Examining Public Attitudes Towards Algorithmic Definitions of Fairness. | Nripsuta Ani Saxena, Karen Huang, Evan DeFilippis, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes, Yang Liu |
| 2019 | EC | Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms. | Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes |
| 2019 | ICML | Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning. | Paul Duetting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath |
| 2019 | ICML | Learning to Collaborate in Markov Decision Processes. | Goran Radanovic, Rati Devidze, David C. Parkes, Adish Singla |
| 2019 | ICML | Fairness without Harm: Decoupled Classifiers with Preference Guarantees. | Berk Ustun, Yang Liu, David C. Parkes |
| 2019 | IJCAI | Ridesharing with Driver Location Preferences. | Duncan Rheingans-Yoo, Scott Duke Kominers, Hongyao Ma, David C. Parkes |
| 2018 | IJCAI | Deep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design. | Noah Golowich, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes |
| 2018 | KDD | Opinion Dynamics with Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion. | Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes, Charalampos E. Tsourakakis |
| 2018 | KDD | Optimizing Cluster-based Randomized Experiments under Monotonicity. | Jean Pouget-Abadie, Vahab S. Mirrokni, David C. Parkes, Edoardo M. Airoldi |
| 2017 | IJCAI | Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots. | David C. Parkes, Paul Tylkin, Lirong Xia |
| 2016 | HCOMP | Practical Peer Prediction for Peer Assessment. | Victor Shnayder, David C. Parkes |
| 2016 | IJCAI | Social Choice for Agents with General Utilities. | Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes |
| 2016 | IJCAI | Correlated Voting. | Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes |
| 2016 | IJCAI | Incentivizing Reliability in Demand-Side Response. | Hongyao Ma, Valentin Robu, Na Li, David C. Parkes |
| 2016 | IJCAI | When are Marginal Congestion Tolls Optimal? | Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes |
| 2016 | IJCAI | Automated Mechanism Design without Money via Machine Learning. | Harikrishna Narasimhan, Shivani Agarwal, David C. Parkes |
| 2016 | IJCAI | Measuring Performance of Peer Prediction Mechanisms Using Replicator Dynamics. | Victor Shnayder, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes |
| 2016 | UAI | A General Statistical Framework for Designing Strategy-proof Assignment Mechanisms. | Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes |
| 2015 | AAAI | Congestion Games with Distance-Based Strict Uncertainty. | Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes |
| 2015 | CSCW | Strategic Voting Behavior in Doodle Polls. | James Y. Zou, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes |
| 2014 | ICML | Computing Parametric Ranking Models via Rank-Breaking. | Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia |
| 2014 | MOBIHOC | Truthful prioritization for dynamic bandwidth sharing. | Victor Shnayder, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia, Jeremy Hoon |
| 2013 | AAAI | Dynamic Social Choice with Evolving Preferences. | David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia |
| 2013 | AAAI | Automated Workflow Synthesis. | Haoqi Zhang, Eric Horvitz, David C. Parkes |
| 2013 | HCOMP | Dwelling on the Negative: Incentivizing Effort in Peer Prediction. | Jens Witkowski, Yoram Bachrach, Peter B. Key, David C. Parkes |
| 2013 | IJCAI | Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders. | Valentin Robu, David C. Parkes, Takayuki Ito, Nicholas R. Jennings |
| 2013 | UAI | Preference Elicitation For General Random Utility Models. | Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia |
| 2012 | AAAI | A Complexity-of-Strategic-Behavior Comparison between Schulze's Rule and Ranked Pairs. | David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia |
| 2012 | AAAI | A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations. | Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes |
| 2012 | AAMAS | Predicting your own effort. | David F. Bacon, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen, Malvika Rao, Ian A. Kash, Manu Sridharan |
| 2012 | AAMAS | Task routing for prediction tasks. | Haoqi Zhang, Eric Horvitz, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes |
| 2012 | CHI | Human computation tasks with global constraints. | Haoqi Zhang, Edith Law, Rob Miller, Krzysztof Gajos, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz |
| 2012 | HCOMP | TurkServer: Enabling Synchronous and Longitudinal Online Experiments. | Andrew Mao, Yiling Chen, Krzysztof Z. Gajos, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Haoqi Zhang |
| 2012 | INFOCOM | Truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing. | Victor Shnayder, Jeremy Hoon, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia |
| 2011 | AAAI | Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting. | Yuga J. Cohler, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia |
| 2011 | AAAI | On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions. | Florin Constantin, Malvika Rao, Chien-Chung Huang, David C. Parkes |
| 2011 | AAAI | Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms. | Jens Witkowski, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes |
| 2011 | SAGT | Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions. | Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes |
| 2010 | AAAI | Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting. | Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia |
| 2010 | AAAI | Hidden Market Design. | Sven Seuken, Kamal Jain, David C. Parkes |
| 2010 | AAAI | Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems. | Sven Seuken, Jie Tang, David C. Parkes |
| 2010 | AAAI | Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions. | William E. Walsh, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields, George L. Nemhauser, David C. Parkes |
| 2010 | AAAI | Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money. | James Y. Zou, Sujit Gujar, David C. Parkes |
| 2010 | ECAI | Dynamic Matching with a Fall-back Option. | Sujit Gujar, David C. Parkes |
| 2010 | HCOMP | Toward automatic task design: a progress report. | Eric Huang, Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Krzysztof Z. Gajos, Yiling Chen |
| 2009 | CCS | On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis. | Julien Freudiger, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, David C. Parkes |
| 2009 | FC | Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy Auctions. | David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Christopher Thorpe |
| 2009 | FC | Cryptographic Combinatorial Securities Exchanges. | Christopher Thorpe, David C. Parkes |
| 2009 | IJCAI | Expressive Power-Based Resource Allocation for Data Centers. | Benjamin Lubin, Jeffrey O. Kephart, Rajarshi Das, David C. Parkes |
| 2009 | IJCAI | A General Approach to Environment Design with One Agent. | Haoqi Zhang, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes |
| 2009 | INFOCOM | An Economically-Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity. | Jacomo Corbo, Shaili Jain, Michael Mitzenmacher, David C. Parkes |
| 2009 | KDD | The role of game theory in human computation systems. | Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes |
| 2009 | OOPSLA | A market-based approach to software evolution. | David F. Bacon, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes, Malvika Rao |
| 2009 | UAI | Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions. | Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes |
| 2009 | SOFSEM | When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures. | David C. Parkes |
| 2009 | TCC | Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. | Shien Jin Ong, David C. Parkes, Alon Rosen, Salil P. Vadhan |
| 2008 | AAAI | Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. | Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, William E. Walsh |
| 2008 | AAAI | Efficient Metadeliberation Auctions. | Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes |
| 2008 | AAAI | An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising. | Sbastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, David M. Pennock |
| 2008 | AAAI | Economic Hierarchical Q-Learning. | Erik G. Schultink, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes |
| 2008 | AAAI | Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design. | Sven Seuken, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes |
| 2008 | AAAI | Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. | William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, Craig Boutilier |
| 2008 | AAAI | Value-Based Policy Teaching with Active Indirect Elicitation. | Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes |
| 2008 | UAI | Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation. | Sevan G. Ficici, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer |
| 2008 | SIGCOMM | Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. | Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Daniel Plakosh, Sven Seuken, Kurt C. Wallnau |
| 2007 | AAAI | An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains. | David C. Parkes, Quang Duong |
| 2007 | FC | Cryptographic Securities Exchanges. | Christopher Thorpe, David C. Parkes |
| 2006 | UAI | Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State. | Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh |
| 2005 | HotOS | Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems. | Jeffrey Shneidman, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Alvin AuYoung, Alex C. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat, Brent N. Chun |
| 2005 | IJCAI | More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives. | Sbastien Lahaie, Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes |
| 2005 | NSDI | Decentralized, Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Networks. | Geoffrey Mainland, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh |
| 2005 | PODC | The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation. | Jacomo Corbo, David C. Parkes |
| 2005 | UAI | Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions. | Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes |
| 2004 | AAAI | GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms. | David C. Parkes, Grant Schoenebeck |
| 2004 | PODC | Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes. | Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes |
| 2001 | IJCAI | Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges. | David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam, Marta Eso |
| 2000 | AAAI | Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice. | David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar |
| 2000 | AAAI | Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment. | David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar |
| 1999 | IJCAI | Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems. | David C. Parkes |