| 2019 | Principal-Agent VCG Contracts. | Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash |
| 2019 | Adaptive-Price Combinatorial Auctions. | Sbastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin |
| 2019 | Observational Data for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Application to Recommender Systems. | Akos Lada, Alexander Peysakhovich, Diego Aparicio, Michael Bailey |
| 2019 | Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice. | Maria Kyropoulou, Josu Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi |
| 2019 | Computing Large Market Equilibria using Abstractions. | Christian Kroer, Alexander Peysakhovich, Eric Sodomka, Nicols E. Stier Moses |
| 2019 | How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically? | Jon M. Kleinberg, Manish Raghavan |
| 2019 | Simplicity Creates Inequity: Implications for Fairness, Stereotypes, and Interpretability. | Jon M. Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan |
| 2019 | Identifying Bid Leakage in Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach. | Dmitry Ivanov, Alexander S. Nesterov |
| 2019 | The Value of Price Discrimination in Large Random Networks. | Jiali Huang, Ankur Mani, Zizhuo Wang |
| 2019 | You Can Lead a Horse to Water: Spatial Learning and Path Dependence in Consumer Search. | Charles Hodgson, Gregory Lewis |
| 2019 | Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms. | Jason D. Hartline, Samuel Taggart |
| 2019 | Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces. | Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, Onno Zoeter |
| 2019 | Consumer-Optimal Market Segmentation. | Nima Haghpapanah, Ron Siegel |
| 2019 | Individual Fairness in Hindsight. | Swati Gupta, Vijay Kamble |
| 2019 | Prophet Inequality for Bipartite Matching: Merits of Being Simple and Non Adaptive. | Nikolai Gravin, Hongao Wang |
| 2019 | Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations. | Nick Gravin, Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Chenhao Zhang |
| 2019 | Mind the Mining. | Guy Goren, Alexander Spiegelman |
| 2019 | Matching for the Israeli: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements. | Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Noam Nisan, Lior Kovalio, Assaf Romm |
| 2019 | The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors. | Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos |
| 2019 | Tracking and Improving Information in the Service of Fairness. | Sumegha Garg, Michael P. Kim, Omer Reingold |
| 2019 | Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games. | Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh, Zinovi Rabinovich, Michael J. Wooldridge |
| 2019 | The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue. | Hu Fu, Christopher Liaw, Sikander Randhawa |
| 2019 | Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals. | Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan |
| 2019 | Managing Market Mechanism Transitions: A Randomized Trial of Decentralized Pricing Versus Platform Control. | Apostolos Filippas, Srikanth Jagabathula, Arun Sundararajan |
| 2019 | Energy Equilibria in Proof-of-Work Mining. | Amos Fiat, Anna R. Karlin, Elias Koutsoupias, Christos H. Papadimitriou |